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The most virulent examples of racial intolerance in twentieth-century Cana-
dian history may be found in British Columbia where riots, 1 a collection of stat-
utes,2 a plethora of propaganda,3 and the forcible movement of some 21,000 Jap-
anese in 19424 demonstrate the hostility of the province's white residents to Asians. 
That hostility was rooted in fear of Asian superiority. Although many British Co-
lumbia attitudes can be explained in terms of social psychology, 5 and many fears 
were grossly exaggerated even to the point of irrationality, Asians provided suf-
ficient, effective competition in the fishing grounds, in the fields, in the market 
place, in the classroom, and on the battlefield to warrant deep fears about the ability 
of white British Columbians to maintain their dominant position in the province. 
Agitation against Asians, explained the Prince Rupert Daily News, is ''a sign 
of inferiority. We fear the Oriental. In many respects he is better than we are." Be-
fore World War II, many white British Columbians feared the challenge to their 
status quo and dreaded the prospect of an Asian takeover. As the Nanaimo Free 
Press observed, the "real reason" for our objections to Oriental immigration is 
"that we are not yet strong enough to assimilate races so alien from us in their habits. 
We are afraid that they would swamp our civilization ... we want to keep the prov-
ince for ourselves. '' 6 White British Columbians believed they had a natural '' right'' 
to occupy the province7 but they were unsure of their ability to maintain it. More-
* Department of History , University of Victoria. 
1 Vancouver was the scene of two riots. See Patricia E. RoY, "The Preservation of the Peace 
in Vancouver: The Aftermath of the Anti-Chinese Riot of 1887", BC Studies, no . 31 (Autumn 1976): 
44-59 and Howard SUGIMOTO, " The Vancouver Riots of 1907: A Canadian Episode", in East 
Across the Pacific, eds: Hilary CoNROY and T. Scott MtY AKAWA (Santa Barbara: American Bibliographic 
Center, 1972), pp. 92-126. Immigration from India was not a continuing concern and is not exam-
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Legal Status in British Columbia of Residents of Oriental Race and Their Descendants'', The Canadian 
Bar Review, IX (January 1931): 1-12. 
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over, their isolation from the rest of Canada, the newness of their society, and the 
"different" qualities of Asians made white British Columbians especially prone to 
self-doubt. 
British Columbians had joined Confederation without enthusiasm and they 
long felt themselves to be distant from the rest of Canada. Premier E. G. Prior ob-
served in 1903, "Victoria is 3,000 miles from Ottawa whereas Ottawa is 30,000 
miles from Victoria.' ' 8 A Victoria journalist titled her memoirs of the first months 
after Pearl Harbor, A Million Miles from Ottawa. 9 The mountains were physical as 
well as psychological barriers . Even after the completion of the transcontinental 
railway in 1885, it was a four or five day journey, assuming there were no slides or 
derailments, from Vancouver to Toronto or Montreal. To the west, in contrast, lay 
the open ocean beyond which lived millions of Asians. Ottawa seemed very far 
away; Asia, very near. British Columbians believed eastern Canadians did not com-
prehend their problems. On occasion, they suggested such imaginative solutions as 
naming Ottawa the sole port of entry for Asians coming to Canada 10 but normally, 
British Columbians confined themselves to "educating the East", 11 about the "Ori-
ental problem" . In addition, British Columbia's reception of immigrants had ape-
culiar British twist. The British-born and the native Canadians who identified them-
selves primarily as British were unusually prominent in the province. 12 "We are 
anxious to keep this a British country. We want British Columbia British and noth-
ing else", declared Premier Simon Fraser Tolmie, a native British Columbian, in 
1928. 1 ~ Although anti-Asian organizations later adopted the phrase, "White Ca-
nada", the weakness of the province's identification with Canada and Canadians 
contributed to its sense of isolation and insecurity and to its receptiveness to racist 
ideas. 
British Columbia has always been overwhelmingly a province of newcomers 
whose position in society was seldom quickly assured. Before World War II over 
half the adult population was born outside the province and many of the newcomers 
were new to Canada as well. Until recent years the population was small and much 
of the province, sparsely settled. "We are in the formative period of our national 
life", claimed one editor in 1921 when the population was just over half a million. 
8 Quoted in Margaret A. ORMSBY, "A Horizontal View", CANADIAN HISTORICAL Asso-
CIATION, Annual Report, 1966, p. 11. 
9 Gwen CASH, A Million Miles from Ottawa (Toronto: Macmillan, 1942). 
10 Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), R. L. Borden Papers, #183248-9. W. J. Lam-
rick and T. H. Cross to Wilfrid Laurier, 5 June 1902. 
11 See Patricia E. RoY, "Educating the 'East'; British Columbia and the Oriental Question 
in the Interwar Years", BC Studies, no. 18 (Summer 1973): 50-69 . 
12 From 1911' through 1941, British Columbia had the greatest percentage of British-born in 
her population of any province and the lowest percentage of Canadian-born. 
Percentages of British Columbians 1911 1921 1931 1941 
Born in Canada 43.1 50.3 54.0 62.7 
Born in the British Isles and possessions 30.1 30.6 27 .3 22.3 
British nicial origin (regardless of birthplace) 67.8 73 .9 70.6 85.0 
CANADA, Census, 1941, vol. I, p. 168 and p. 173, plus calculations based on figures therein and in 
the 1931 census. 
13 Montreal Gazette, 17 September 1928. 
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" We cannot afford to take any chances in regard to the building up of a nation with 
ideas and standards of living different from our own~" 14 
British Columbians, of course, drew on an international repertoire of anti-
Asian arguments for anti-Asian prejudice occurred almost everywhere Asians mi-
grated or sought to migrate. 15 California was the most convenient source of such 
arguments . The federal Royal Commissioners who investigated Chinese immigra-
tion in the mid-1880s took much of their evidence in San Francisco; some of the 
British Columbia agitators in the 1920s corresponded with V. S. McClatchey, the 
leader of the California exclusionists; and British Columbia protesters often drew 
on California propaganda to illustrate their assertion that, if additional restrictions 
were not imposed on Asians, the "Whole population" of some districts would be-
come Asian. 16 
The feelings of insecurity and inferiority underlying the assorted anti-Asian 
arguments can be illustrated and analysed under several main headings: the chal-
lenge to morality, overwhelming numbers, the Japanese military threat, "unfair" 
economic competition, and, especially, inassimilability . These divisions are some-
what artificial; arguments and motives were seldom clear-cut or logical. Those who 
feared economic competition, for example, often mentioned social problems as a 
reason for restricting Asians. The arguments also tended to be repetitious although 
their intensity and emphasis varied. Election campaigns; particularly federal ones, 
usually generated an extra outburst of anti-Asian propaganda as could a real or ap-
prehended influx of Asians such as the large-scale immigration of 1907, a sudden 
influx of returning Chinese in 1919, or rumours of illegal Japanese immigration in 
1937 and 1938. Specific incidents such as newspaper accounts of the illegal drug 
trade or Japanese aggression in China could elicit arguments about the moral men-
ace of the Chinese or the military danger of the Japanese respectively. The passage 
of the exclusionist· Chinese Immigration Act in 1923 halted Chinese immigration 
and gradually reduced the Chinese "threat" to British Columbia. Moreover, be-
cause the Chinese population was predominantly male, the death rate exceeded the 
birth rate. The Japanese population in the province, in contrast, continued to in-
crease and much of the anti-Asian agitation came to be directed specifically at them. 
Nevertheless, all of the mutually reinforcing anti-Asian arguments had one feature 
in common; their concern about white self-preservation. •:self-preservation is the 
first law of nature;" declared the Vancouver Sun , "it must be the fundamental and 
ever underlying motive of white Canadians in a white Canada." 17 
14 Prince Rupert Daily News , 13 July 1921. 
15 California and Natal are obvious examples of the former; Australia and New Zealand, of the 
latter. A sense of insecurity occurred elsewhere. For some American illustrations see Richard 
HoFSTADTER, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: George Braziller, 1959), pp. 185ff 
and John HIGHAM, Strangers in the Land (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 162. There are no com-
parable studies of Canadian thought; however, many of Carl BERGER's imperialists appear to have 
believed " foreigners" could be assimilated into British subjects, that it was the white man's burden 
to raise up the " weaker races". The Sense of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 
pp. 147-52 and 226-30. 
•• For example, C. M. Watson and C. J. Hurt to H. H. Stevens, 31 March 1926. Copy in 
PAC, W. L. M. King Papers, #118453-4. 
11 Vancouver Sun , 24 June 1921. 
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The concern for self-preservation and the inferiority complex which pervaded 
the anti-Asian arguments can be seen in a relatively uncomplicated form in some 
of the reactions to the presence of Asian children in provincial schools. Advocates 
of segregated schools had claimed, among other things, that the presence of non-
English speaking Asians retarded the progress of their white classmates. The demo-
lition of that argument in the 1920s did little for white egos. A survey of the intel-
ligence of all British Columbia school children ascertained that the Japanese were 
brighter than the Chinese but that both were ''greatly superior to the average white 
population" .18 This seemed to be confirmed in 1925 when Nobuichi Yamaoka, 
who had known no English when he came to Canada from Japan three years earlier, 
led the province in the high school entrance examinations. To many whites, this 
shocking event corroborated their worst fears that "whites are not able to compete 
with the Orientals either in labor or study", 19 reinforcing the suspicion that "the 
'yellow peril' is not yellow battleships nor yellow settlers but yellow intelli-
gence. " 20 
Some whites required more protection than others. A second argument for 
segregated schools was the belief that Asian children threatened the morals of their 
white classmates. In commenting on proposals to set up segregated schools after a 
Chinese school boy servant murdered his white mistress, cut up her body and stuf-
fed it in a furnace, the Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser remarked: "moral stan-
dards of races are difficult to classify in order of merit and there are many daily in-
cidents to make European Canadians modest in their claim of superior virtue. But 
there is no doubt that the moral, social and economic conditions of white Canadi-
ans, native and immigrant, deteriorate in association and competition with large 
numbers of Asiatics." 21 Children, especially, needed to be protected from this 
"harmful" influence for, with them, "there is a tendency for the evil to work a 
stronger influence than the good. " 22 
Women and girls were also deemed to require special protection against Ori-
ental immorality. In 1919, the Legislature amended the Municipal Act to forbid 
Chinese to employ white women or girls in any capacity. 23 In urging Vancouver, 
which had its own charter, to adopt a similar law, an officer of the Juvenile Deten-
tion Home blamed the absence of such a measure for the recent need to remove a 
white girl, "in a delicate condition", from a Chinese restaurantY The need to pro-
tect women and young men was also a major argument against the illegal drug traf-
fic. Drawing on two newspaper series of anti-drug articles, Leon J. Ladner told Par-
liament in 1922 of "snow parties" where wealthy Chinese introduced white girls 
18 Peter SANDIFORD, "The Testing Programme" , in Survey of the School System, J. H. PUTNAM 
and G. M. WEIR (Victoria: King's Printer, 1925), p. 508. 
19 Prince Rupert Daily News, 25 July 1925. 
20 Vancouver Sun, 24 July 1925. 
21 Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, 7 April 1914. 
22 British Columbia Magazine, X (June 1914): 334. 
23 Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan passed similar laws but repealed or withdrew them 
in response to complaints from the Chinese consul . In 1923, British Columbia replaced the clause of the 
Municipal Act with the Women and Girls' Protection Act which forbade any person to employ or lodge 
a white or Indian woman or girl if local police officials did not deem it "advisable in the interests of the 
morals of such women and girls". (BRITISH CoLUMBIA, Revised Statutes, 1924, c . 275). The original 
bill's reference to Chinese and Japanese was withdrawn after diplomatic objections. 
24 Vancouver Sun, 16 April1919. 
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to narcotics. He quoted with approval the assertion of Captain Macaulay of the 
Asiatic Exclusion League, that doing away with Asians would save "the souls and 
bodies of thousands of young men and women who are yearly being sent to a living 
hell and to the grave". 25 But the Chinese were only the agents of immorality. 
Captain Macaulay claimed Chinese drug pedlars were tools of Japan's imperialist 
plan to undermine the physical and mental culture of Canada. 26 
Protestant church leaders actively campaigned against the drug traffic and its 
effects on morality. Some of them shared the general sense of white inferiority or, 
at least, used it to secure moral and fmancial support for church work among Asians 
in the province. Rev. N. L. Ward, a superintendent of Anglican Missions to the 
Chinese in British Columbia, warned that ''unless the Christian churches of British 
Columbia rise up in earnest to convert these Oriental people in their midst, the 
history of the North African church will be repeated and Christianity will be wiped 
out by an Oriental wave of theosophic Buddhist thought . . . Unless we christianize 
the Chinese and Japanese in our midst, the day may come when there will be 
Buddhist and Shinto temples on Shaughnessy Heights and Rockland Avenue, and a 
temple erected to Confucius where now stands the Cathedral of the Holy Rosary''. 27 
Concern for the preservation of their traditional moral and religious values 
was but one aspect of British Columbia's fear of being overwhelmed by the numer-
ically superior Asians. This fear first appeared in respect to immigration; later, it 
found its source in the seemingly high birth rate of the Japanese. 28 As early as the 
1870s, British Columbians sought to restrict Asian immigration. Even though the 
federal government imposed a head tax on Chinese in 1885 and gradually raised it 
to $500 by 1904, the Chinese continued to come. In the meantime, significant num-
bers of Japanese began to arrive. The conclusion of a Gentlemen's Agreement with 
Japan in 1908 reduced the number of Japanese entering the country but did not halt 
immigration. 29 The percentage of Asians in the provincial population remained 
fairly steady at a little over seven percent from 1911 to 1931 but British Columbians 
still feared their "thinly populated province could easily be submerged by an Ori-
ental migration". 30 So deeply implanted was British Columbia's insecurity that a 
prominent journalist described his province as ''one of the last frontiers of the white 
race against the yellow and brown. It is a land where a hoary civilization meets a 
modem one, and where the swarming millions of ancient people, stung into restless 
25 CANADA, PARLIAMENT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Debates, 8 May 1922, pp. 1516-30. 
26 Nanaimo Free Press, 13 April 1922. 
27 PAC, Department of Immigration Records, RG 76 Accn 70/47, File 815661. "Report on 
Oriental Situation presented to ·the General Ministerial Association .. . and adopted Monday, January 9, 
1922", with B. C. Freeman, secretary, General Ministerial Association of Vancouver to Minister of 
the Interior, 24 January 1922. 
28 For an explanation of the Japanese birth rate see C. H. YouNG and H. R. Y. REID, The 
Japanese Canadians (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1938), pp. 25-31. 
29 The secret 1908 agreement referred only to agricultural and domestic labourers whose 
numbers were limited to 400 per year. The British Columbia public, however, believed it referred to 
all classes of immigrants and hence was upset whenever the annual figure rose above 400. The 1928 
agreement applied to all classes and limited them to 150 per year. It also specified that no more than 
half should be female thus limiting the rate of Japanese family formation. 
30 Nanaimo Free Press, 23 February 1917. 
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life by modem events, are constantly impinging on an attractive land held by sparse 
thousands of whites. "31 
Although Asian immigration declined to a trickle by the late 1920s - a re-
vision of the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1928 reduced the maximum number of 
Japanese immigrants per annum to 150- the Japanese population was still increas-
ing. The Japanese had a birth rate as much as three times that of the white popula-
tion. 32 Agitators suggested Japanese girls were taught it was their patriotic duty to 
have as many children as possible33 and cited such extreme examples as the Japa-
nese women on Salt Spring Island who supposedly had twenty-three children in 
twenty-five years. 34 When Vancouver's Medical Health Officer reported that on a 
world-wide basis Orientals had a birth rate four times that of other races, Alderman 
Halford Wilson asserted that, "in the course of a few years British Columbia will 
come under Oriental domination". 35 
The notion of superior Asian numbers was also used to justify the denial of 
the franchise to them. Giving Asians the vote, suggested many agitators, would be 
the "thin edge of the wedge." During the 1935 federal election campaign, both 
Liberals and Conservatives attacked a C.C.F. proposal to enfranchise Asians. A 
Conservative candidate warned that "granting the franchise to Orientals ... would 
be dangerous, particularly in British Columbia, where in ten years Japanese would 
dominate the Pacific Coast". 36 A Liberal speaker was even more emphatic. 
''The franchise has one inevitable result and that is Orientals in the Civil Service and 
Orientals in the Legislature." He asked a Victoria audience, "How would you like 
your daughter to apply to a Japanese for a job in the Civil Service or to a Chinese 
for a job in the Public Works Department?" 37 As well, there was a circular argu-
ment that because Asians did not have the franchise they were undesirable citizens. 38 
By the late 1930s, the Japanese also appeared to be a military threat. By that 
time there was good reason for British Columbians to be fearful. During their suc-
cessful invasion of China, Japanese forces committed many well-reported atroc-
ities against both soldiers and civilians. In British Columbia, defences were inade-
quate. Again, politicians exploited these fears. While Conservative Members of 
Parliament such as Howard Green attacked the government for insufficient de-
fences, 39 a Liberal candidate won a by-election in the traditionally Conservative 
seat of Victoria. According to a Conservative apologist, the Liberals spread propa-
ganda "among the women, stressing the need for greater protection against inva-
sion of our coast by the Japs. It was pointed out what would happen to them and their 
31 John NELSON, The Canadian Provinces: Their Problems and Policies (Toronto: Nelson, 
1924), p. 177. 
32 Vancouver Daily Province, 7 July 1923. 
33 Vancouver Daily World, 29 March 1923. 
34 Prince Rupert Daily News, 7 March 1923; PAC, H. H. Stevens Papers, vol. 3, File 29. 
H. H. Stevens, Speech to Luncheon of Canadian Credit Mens Trust Association, 27 June 1927. 
35 Vancouver Daily Province, 20 July 1939. 
36 Victoria Daily Times, 11 October 1935. Both Liberal and Conservative advertisements 
referred to "50,000 Orientals in B.C." and the C.C.F. plan to give them the vote. 
37 Victoria Daily Times, 2 October 1935. 
38 Kamloops Telegram, 10 February 1921. 
39 HouSE OF COMMONS, Debates, I April1938, p. 1966. 
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families; they would be killed and their property destroyed by shell fire ." The Lib-
erals claimed the Bennett government had spent nothing on Pacific Coast defence 
while the Liberals would increase their effort to defend the coast if their candidate 
were elected. 40 
British Columbia's fears of a Japanese invasion were not new. A local poet 
had well expressed the fear: 
Ye Japanese clad with equipments of war 
Whose armies and navies and Juggernaut car 
Would crush, if they dare, and claim as their own 
What belongs to the white man- the white man alone . 
Avaunt ye whom envy and malice propel 
To unsurp all our splendour by tactics of Hell!41 
That poem was published in 1909 when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still very 
much in effect. It was not merely poetic imagination nor was the fear confined to 
the possibility of external attack. ' 'Today we have in British Columbia in the neigh-
bourhood of 12,000 Japs , all ex-soldiers, all armed and ready if any trouble arises 
tomorrow. In addition, ... our coast line is known to thousands of these yellow men . .. 
and they work for the control in industrial development" , wrote Premier Richard 
McBride in 1912.4 2 
The idea of Japanese spies persisted. It could be used as an argument against 
allowing Japanese to work in the coal fields of Vancouver Island43 or participating 
in the fisheries. 44 By 1937 and 1938, spy stories were epidemic . On Vancouver 
Island, for example, the story of a secret Japanese arsenal increased in " frightful-
ness" as it was told . Police investigators who traced it back to the bar of the Cana-
dian Legion in the coal mining town of Cumberland found it had no substance. 45 
Nevertheless, such stories persisted. By 1940, not only were agitators such as Al-
derman Wilson of Vancouver suggesting the Japanese might engage in fifth column 
activities46 but some military and police officials on the coast claimed many Jap-
enese " are known to possess firearms and to be definitely anti-British in senti-
ment" .47 
40 PAC, R. B. Bennett Papers, vol. 840, #522412-3 . H. J. Barber, M.P. to R. B. Bennett, 
1 December 1937. The Liberals , incidentally, did relatively little to improve coast defences. See T. M. 
HuNTER, " Coast Defences in British Columbia, 1939-1941 : Attitudes and Realities" , BC Studies , 
no. 28 (Winter 1975-6): 3-28. 
41 Nigel ToURNEUR, " Naval Battle Off Vancouver" , Westward Ho! Magazine, IV (April 
1909): 216. 
42 Provincial Archives of British Columbia (hereafter PABC) , Lottie Bowron Papers, McBride 
Confidential and Personal Letter Book, 1912-5. Richard McBride to Martin Burrell, 21 January 1912. 
43 Vancouver World, 13 November 1922. 
44 Vancouver World, 10 October 1921. 
45 Cowichan Leader , 20 January 1938. 
46 City of Vancouver Archives, Mayor's Correspondence, 1940. Speech, 16 May 1940. 
47 Department of National Defence, Directorate of History , File 169.012 (D2) . " An Appre-
ciation of the Situation in B.C. in the Event of War with Japan", Victoria , 24 June 1940. See also 
T. W. S. Parsons, Commissioner of British Columbia Police, "Position of the Japanese in British 
Columbia", 24 September 1940. PAC, Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25 G1, file 263-
38; Cabinet War Committee Minutes, 9 July 1940, PAC. 
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The longest standing and most realistic argument against Asians in British 
Columbia was their economic challenge to white dominance. There was ample 
evidence to demonstrate their dominance of certain industries. In 1919, the peak 
year of their employment in the fisheries, Japanese held 3,267 licences or nearly 
half the total number of licences issued that year. 48 The Chinese largely controlled 
market gardening and the distribution of fresh vegetables; the Japanese did not enter 
the Fraser Valley berry industry until after 1914 but, within a decade, controlled 
thirty-nine percent of the acreage devoted to small fruit growing .49 Both Chi-
nese and Japanese became prominent in retailing as well as in the service industries 
in the cities after World War One. In Vancouver in 1937, for example, Asians held 
ninety-one percent of the greengrocers' licences, fifty-three percent of the cleaners 
and dyers' licences, and twenty-nine percent of the tailors' licences. 5° It did not 
matter that all of these were specialized fields, the statistics clearly suggested that 
if Asians could force white men out of certain occupations, they might eventually 
drive them out of many more. 
Before World War I labour organizations were in the forefront of anti-
Asian agitation; by the 1920s and 1930s, farmers and retail merchants51 were 
often the most prominent objectors to the presence of Asians, their lower standard 
of living, and willingness to work longer and harder for lower returns than white 
men. The arguments of the various economic interest groups were often similar, 
often stressing many of the traditional shibboleths against Asians and the threat to 
others rather than their own immediate fears. It was not an agricultural group but 
the Vancouver Board of Trade which told Prime Minister King that ''in certain sec-
tions of the province", the Japanese "have succeeded by their ability for intensive 
cultivation, in practically ousting the white settler". 52 
Government responded to such entreaties. As early as the 1870s the province 
attempted to restrict, by law, the employment opportunities of Asians. Over suc-
ceeding years, the province- sometimes in defiance of the federal government as 
in the case of alien mining laws, sometimes in co-operation with it as in the fishing 
licence reduction programme of the 1920s - devised a collection of laws to keep 
Asians out of certain industries and occupations . Asians could not be employed on 
public works, on certain crown timber lands, or government contracts. Since many 
professional organizations required their members to be on the voters' list, the dis-
franchised Asians were barred from such careers as law and pharmacy. Provincial 
minimum wage legislation introduced in 1926 was designed to drive Asians out of 
the lumber mills. 
Paradoxically, the laws designed to limit Oriental economic competition 
forced many of them to leave the employed class and become entrepreneurs . This 
48 YouNG and REID, The Japanese Canadians, p. 43. 
49 BRITISH COLUMBIA, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, Report on Oriental Activities Within the 
Province (Victoria: King's Printer, 1927), pp. 5 and 22. 
50 
''Licensed Orientals in the City of Vancouver - Year 1937'' . Vancouver, City Hall , 6 May 
1938. 
5 1 See Patricia E. RoY, "Protecting their Pocketbooks and Preserving their Race: White 
Merchants and Oriental Competition", in Cities in the West, eds: A. R. McCoRMACK and Ian 
MAcPHERSON (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1975), pp. 116-38. 
52 PAC, RG 76, Accn 69/17, W. E. Payne toW. L. M. King , 25 January 1923. 
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created new variations on the theme of "unfair competition". In a leaflet outlining 
their opposition to enfranchising Asians, the Native Sons of British Columbia 
explained: 
Many of us can well remember the days when the Orientals - then comparatively few 
in number - were our servants; we saw them leave those humble domestic and manual 
pursuits in which they were engaged and become the competitors of our farmers; then, 
gradually they entered into trade and the business occupations of our urban life, and 
invaded the professions. Once our servants, now our competitors in industrial occupa-
tions and commercial and economic spheres - today they are demanding full citizen-
ship- give it to them and tomorrow they will be our masters. 5 3 
The Nanaimo Herald expressed a similar sentiment when it complained: 
It is bad enough that good Canadians are unable to find employment while Orientals 
are at work, it is worse when Orientals become employers themselves, engage in trade 
and business and even settle on the land. These settlers can never become Canadians. 
There can never be any blending of the two races, and the Canadians cannot live in com-
petition with the Oriental in any line of business.54 
A classic example of the objection to the Oriental entrepreneur occurred in the Co-
wichan Valley where the farmers in 1914 suggested a scheme to allow the tempo-
rary admission of Asians as agricultural and tlomestic labourers. 55 A few years later, 
residents of that area initiated a petition calling for legislation to require municipal 
approval before any Asian could buy or lease land. 56 
White farmers feared Asian competition would drive them off the land. Fruit 
growers in the Creston Valley claimed that if Chinese continued to settle reclaim-
ed land there, their produce would "eliminate the White Farmer, since he is unable 
to compete with the Oriental''. 57 A Vancouver Island potato grower told a Legis-
lative Committee investigating vegetable marketing, "we cannot live and work like 
the Oriental, the way they produce those goods ... He lives like a rat and works like 
the devil. " 58 
In their rhetoric , the farmers also stressed the almost mystical qualities of the 
land and its importance in preserving the white race. These arguments appealed to 
others. "The ownership of land is different from the possession of any other com-
modity", asserted one weekly paper. "A house can be burnt down and a busi-
ness destroyed but land passes on from generation to generation as long as the 
world rolls on. " 59 When rumours circulated in the Okanagan Valley that the large 
Coldstream Ranch near Vernon was passing into Japanese hands, the Con-
servative M.L.A. for South Okanagan, J. W. Jones, spoke at a mass meeting in 
Kelowna. He remarked on the extent of Japanese land ownership in California and 
53 NATIVE SqNs OF BRITISH CoLUMBIA, Argument Advanced by the Native Sons of British 
Columbia in Opposition to Granting of Orienta/Franchise [New Westminster: Jackson Printing, c. 1932] . 
54 NanaimoHerald , 10 May 1922. 
55 BRITISH COLUMBIA, ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR, Report (Victoria: King's Printer, 
1914), p. M26. 
56 PABC, Premier's Official Correspondence, 1921. Jas . Greig, Clerk, Municipal Council of 
Duncan to Premier John Oliver, 20 July 1921. 
5 7 PAC, H. H . Stevens Papers, vol. 59. R. B. Robinson to H. H . Stevens, 30 April 1936. 
58 
" Select Standing Committee on Agriculture of the British Columbia Legislature to Inves-
tigate the B.C. Coast Vegetable Marketing Board and Its Agencies, 16-20 November 1936", p. 140. 
59 Comox Argus , 25 December 1919. 
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Washington, the declining portion of British in the Canadian population, and the 
unique problems of British Columbia because of the presence of Doukhobors and 
Orientals. In conclusion, he warned, "the passage of the ownership of the soil, on 
which our whole civil foundation rested" could not be tolerated. 60 
Few British Columbians would have admitted there was any possibility of in-
corporating Asians into their society . Indeed, the fundamental argument against the 
Asian was his alleged inassimilability. Every white British Columbian presumably 
understood this catchword but did not necessarily define it in precisely the same 
way. Nevertheless, it always included the concept of "difference" and usually 
referred to Asian superiority. "We must recognize the fact that all history has so 
far demonstrated the fact that the Oriental and white races do not assimilate", ex-
plained Rev. A. C. Cooke, a prominent Congregationalist clergyman. "This is 
fundamental and vital. It is not to say that these races are inferior to us. In some ways 
they show a decided superiority, but it is that they are different - different not only 
in color and physical build, but in habits, in tradition, in ideals and customs. " 61 
In a simple form, inassimilability was often a variation of the economic ar-
gument, the difference in standards of living, 62 but it was social as well. "The wide 
difference between the Orientals and the rest of our Canadian population in lan-
guage, tradition and customs of life make difficult, if not impossible, the apprecia-
tion by the Orientals of our social, political and national ideals, and ... the impossi-
bility of assimilation makes it undesirable for large and solid communities to be 
permanently located in small Anglo-Saxon communities", declared the Farmers' 
Institutes as they passed a resolution calling for a prohibition of Asian ownership 
of farm land. 63 "Social pressure", asserted the Vancouver World, is the Asiatics' 
"strongest force in driving out the white families who pioneered in the district he 
invades''. 64 In the cities, critics complained Orientals coming in large numbers had 
shown themselves to be "impossible of assimilation". They had not entered "the 
citizen life of the country" but "grouped themselves together in the worst parts of 
Canadian cities and become festering sores". 65 By the 1930s, the Chinese popula-
tion was declining but the inassimilability argument continued to be applied to the 
Japanese. "Here in British Columbia", commented a west coast of Vancouver Is-
land weekly, "we have growing up alongside one another, two cultures and two 
races without any hope or desire for fusion. If the Japanese are inferior to us in some 
ways, they are certainly our superiors in others; but they are so different it seems 
hopeless that we should ever amalgamate with them. " 66 Of course, no one really 
wanted the Japanese or Chinese to assimilate. As Japanese Consul Ukita complain-
ed, "the Japanese are trying their best to become Canadians. They are doing every-
thing they can to become assimilated into the country. But you will not let them. We 
are doing our best but we cannot change our color in a day. " 67 
6° Kelowna Courier, 22 January 1922. 
61 Vancouver Daily World, 30 July 1921. 
62 For example, Vancouver Daily World, 6 February 1920. 
63 Fruit and Farm, V (March 1914): 189. 
64 Vancouver Daily World, 26 January 1922. 
65 Rev. John MacKay, quoted in Vancouver Daily World, 17 July 1919. 
66 West Coast Advocate, 3 March 1938. 
67 Vancouver Daily World, 6 February 1920. 
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Economic, social and cultural differences were only part of the inassimilation 
argument. "Putting it bluntly", declared H. H. Stevens, M.P., "assimilation, after 
all means inter-marriage.'' This idea was equally repugnant to whites and Asians. 68 
As Attorney-General M. A. Manson explained, "the real objection to the Oriental 
and the one that is permanent and incurable is the ethnological differences as between 
the white and Oriental races ." It is hard to believe, he continued, "that in the Divine 
arrangement of things it was intended that the blood of the Oriental and the blood of 
the white should mix''. 69 Concern about miscegnation, of course, underlay much of 
the agitation for the protection of women and girls and for the establishment of seg-
regated schools. 
The " ethnological argument" was useful. It seemed to be the basis of race 
preservation; it transcended any economic or political self-interests and hence seem-
ed unselfish; and, being a possibility rather than a reality, it was particularly useful 
for propagandists who exploited vague fears. Though it was sometimes resurrected 
as in Premier Pattullo's use of it to justify his demand before the Rowell-Sirois Com-
mission for the return of "as many Orientals as possible ... to the land from which 
they came" ,7° the frequency of the use of ethnological argument generally declin-
ed from the 1920s to the 1930s. In the early 1930s, white British Columbians 
felt relatively secure against Asians;71 in the late 1930s they had a real threat in the 
form of Japan's aggressive policies. Given the long tradition of fear of Asians it is 
not surprising that British Columbians acted as they did after Pearl Harbor and forced 
the federal government to evacuate the Japanese from the coast in order to protect 
them from hostile and fearful whites. 72 
Some politicians such as Ian Mackenzie survived the Second World War with 
their anti-Asian beliefs intact; others changed their minds. H. H. Stevens, who had 
been speaking out against the Oriental threat since before the First World War, told 
700 Chinese at a 1949 federal campaign meeting that if he were elected, he would 
represent them "as my fellow Canadian citizens. There will be no discrimination, 
no difference. " 73 Stevens was responding to a sR_ecific new circumstance, the en-
franchisement of the Chinese in 1948, itself a symptom of change in British Co-
lumbia. In the immediate post-war decades, the province was prospering; there 
were plenty of well-paying jobs for everyone. Immigrants were coming from many 
parts of the world. Though Chinese were again able to immigrate to Canada, there 
was little danger of them overwhelming the securely established white population . 
The bitterness against the Japanese had been intense; their disabilities were imposed 
a little longer but were also withdrawn by 1950. Japan posed no military threat. 
The Japanese-Canadians had been dispersed throughout Canada and were no longer 
unique to British Columbia. Moreover, despite harrowing circumstances, they had 
68 Vancouver Daily Province, 2 December 1919. Inter-racial marriages were rare. The Reg-
istrar of Vital Statistics seldom reported more than one or two a year. 
69 PABC, Attorney-General's Papers, 2060-17-18. "Attorney-General's Speech on the Oriental 
Debate in the British Columbia Legislature, 15 November 1922". 
70 British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation (Victoria: King's Printer, 1938), p. 353. 
71 See Patricia E. Rov , "The Illusion of Toleration: White Opinion of Asians in British 
Columbia, 1929-1937", annual meeting of the Canadian Society for Asian Studies, Fredericton, May 
1977. 
72 See WARD, "British Columbia and the Japanese Evacuation". 
73 Vancouver Daily Province, 22 June 1940. 
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proven themselves loyal to Canada. As well, the war had made racial hostility un-
fashionable. 74 In their secure and prosperous world, white British Columbians 
could shed their anti-Asian fears and accept their Asian neighbours not as potential 
superiors but as equals. 
74 Ironically, there is today some concern in the Japanese community that it may disappear as 
the Sansei, the third generation, increasingly intermarry with the white community. Ken ADACHI, The 
Enemy that Never Was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 362-63. 
